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INTRODUCTION 
Employers have genuine concerns about potential liability for harm caused 
by their employees.  These concerns may increase substantially if an employee 
has a criminal record.  Under state doctrines of negligent hiring and retention, 
employers have been liable to victims injured by an employee if the employer 
knew or should have known that its employee might render harm to another.1  
This knowledge sometimes can be established by the fact that the employee 
who caused the injury had a criminal conviction.2  An employer may be liable 
if the injury was foreseeable because that employee had a conviction.3  This 
raises the question of when the harm is foreseeable, which state courts 
approach in a variety of ways. 
The United States Attorney General’s Report on Criminal History 
Background Checks recognized that employers could be held liable under 
negligent hiring doctrines if that employer fails to determine “whether 
placement of the individual in the position would create an unreasonable risk 
to other employees or the public.”4  This potential liability raises the question 
of how an employer makes risk determinations at the time of hire.  This 
determination is made much more difficult, given the variety of methods and 
factors that courts consider when reviewing a negligent hiring claim. 
An employer that receives applications from ex-offenders is faced with a 
dilemma.  On the one hand, employers lack specific guidance from the courts 
as to how they could avoid liability for negligent hiring if an ex-offender who 
they hired subsequently causes harm.  Under the different standards used by 
state courts, it may matter what crime the employee committed, how long ago 
it happened, and how the employee has behaved in the interim.  On the other 
hand, employers cannot adopt outright bans on hiring ex-offenders without the 
strong possibility of liability for adversely impacting applicants of color or 
applicants with disabilities.5  The rates of incarceration for different racial and 
ethnic groups and persons with disabilities can easily establish an adverse 
 
 1. Leroy D. Clark, A Civil Rights Task: Removing Barriers to Employment of Ex-convicts, 
38 U.S.F. L. REV. 193, 196–97 (2004). 
 2. Id. at 197 (citing Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
 3. Id. 
 4. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 1 (2006), available at http://www.us 
doj.gov/olp/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf. 
 5. See El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2007); Green v. Mo. Pac. 
R.R. Co., 549 F.2d 1158, 1160–61 (8th Cir. 1977) (citing Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 
1290, 1298–99 (8th Cir. 1975)); EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 
750–51 (S.D. Fla. 1989); EEOC, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF CONVICTION RECORDS 
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1987), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
policy/docs/convict1.html. 
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impact caused by an employer’s blanket refusal to hire an applicant with a 
criminal record.6  If an employer’s hiring practice or criteria has an adverse 
impact on members of a protected class, Title VII requires “some level of 
empirical proof that challenged hiring criteria accurately predicted job 
performance.”7 
To avoid adverse impact claims, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) regulations suggest limits on an employer’s 
consideration of applicants’ criminal records.8  According to the EEOC, an 
employer should take into account the nature and gravity of the offense, the 
time that has passed since conviction and/or completion of the sentence, and 
the nature of the employment.9  Yet a state court reviewing a claim of 
negligent hiring may not relieve an employer of liability based on these factors, 
depending on the court’s approach. 
This paper will review federal and state court decisions that have 
determined whether an employer made a sufficient determination regarding the 
risk posed by someone it hires or retains who later caused harm to others.  
Specifically, court decisions will be examined for guidance as to how an 
employer can (or cannot) rely on the information it has gained during the 
application process to first, make a determination about whether to hire the 
applicant and second, avoid liability if that employee later causes harm to 
another.  Negligent retention claims provide additional guidance as to when 
such harm is foreseeable. 
 
 6. Over a lifetime, African Americans have an 18.6% chance of going to prison and 
Hispanics have a 10% chance, compared to 3.4% for Whites.  THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. 
POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 8 tbl.9 (2003), available at bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
piusp01.pdf.  The prevalence of imprisonment in 2001 was higher for black males at the rate of 
16.6% and Hispanic males at 7.7%, compared to the rate of 2.6% for white males.  Id. at 5 tbl.5.  
One study found that the prevalence of serious mental illness among inmates ranges from 14.5% 
for males to 31% for females among recently admitted inmates at jails in Maryland and New 
York.  Henry J. Steadman et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness Among Jail Inmates, 60 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 761, 764–65 (2009).  As many as 56% of state prisoners, 45% of federal 
prisoners, and 64% of local jail inmates have reported a recent mental health problem.  DORIS J. 
JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL 
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=789. 
 7. El, 479 F.3d at 240. 
 8. Note that the EEOC’s guidelines may not be entitled to great deference.  Cf. id. at 244 
(citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991)). 
 9. EEOC, supra note 5, at 1. 
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I.  OVERVIEW 
In many negligent hiring cases, the difficult interpretations of whether the 
harm was reasonably foreseeable are sent to a jury.10  Therefore, the reported 
decisions offer a limited amount of guidance for employers who seek to avoid 
liability for negligent hiring.  At the same time, courts reviewing the adverse 
impact of policies limiting or blocking the hiring of ex-offenders have made it 
clear that a concern for liability based on negligent hiring theories does not 
override an employer’s obligations to avoid discrimination under Title VII.11 
In a meeting on the adverse impact of refusing to hire ex-offenders, 
Professor Foreman has noted that “[a] revised set of EEOC guidelines would 
provide employers with guidance as to what constitutes due care in hiring 
practices and indeed a safe harbor from negligence suits.”12  First, Professor 
Foreman suggested that an employer who sued for negligent hiring could rely 
on EEOC guidelines, which include considerations of foreseeability and 
reasonable care to provide a defense to a claim of negligent hiring.13  The 
Supreme Court, Professor Foreman noted, followed this same logic in its 
decision addressing employers’ concerns over potential liability for harm to an 
employee’s unborn child in Johnson Controls:14 “[w]ithout negligence, it 
would be difficult for a court to find liability on part of the employer.  If under 
general tort principles, Title VII bans [discriminatory policies] . . . and the 
employer has not acted negligently, the basis for holding an employer liable 
seems remote at best.”15 
Professor Foreman suggested that there should be “guidelines, policies, 
and statutes that provide incentives for those with criminal background 
histories to rehabilitate and prepare themselves for re-entry into the job market 
while rewarding employers who hire them.”16  He advised focusing on “the 
nature of the crime, the time since it occurred, the effort of the ex-convict to 
rehabilitate, and the nature of the job” to make a determination in the job-
hiring process.17  However, Professor Foreman does not provide any more 
 
 10. See, e.g., Frye v. Am. Painting Co., 642 N.E.2d 995, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Valdez v. 
Warner, 742 P.2d 517, 520–21 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). 
 11. See, e.g., Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Bd. Trs. S. Ill. 
Univ. v. Knight, 516 N.E.2d 991 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987). 
 12. Michael L. Foreman, Professor & Dir. of Civil Rights Appellate Clinic, Pa. State Univ. 
Dickinson Sch. of Law, Remarks at EEOC Meeting on Employment Discrimination Faced by 
Individuals with Arrest and Conviction Records (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.eeoc. 
gov/eeoc/meetings/11-20-08/foreman.cfm. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. (citing UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 208 (1991)). 
 15. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 208). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Foreman, supra note 12. 
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specific guidance for employers on how they can avoid liability for negligent 
hiring while still considering the hiring of ex-offenders. 
Commentators have called for greater guidance for employers who face 
conflicting public policy considerations—the negative effect on recidivism 
provided by employment versus the compensation by employers for victims 
who are harmed by employees who were ex-offenders.18  Professor Lillard 
summarizes the public policy considerations: 
[W]e want to constrain or direct the behavior of the defendant and his 
compatriots only up to a point, a point often defined by the elusive term 
“reasonableness.” We do not want defendants to be so cautious that they are 
paralyzed, nor do we want to place too heavy a burden on various 
constituencies in society.  These constituencies include potential defendant 
employers, current and potential employees, and defendants’ customers.19 
If liability is expanded for negligent hiring, Professor Lillard notes, “[a]nyone 
with a criminal record, especially a record of a sexual or financial impropriety, 
may find it even more difficult to get a job.  Employers, like most potential 
defendants, are cautious and tend to overprotect themselves.”20 
Echoing Professor Foreman, another commentator has stated that “the 
proper way to balance the competing public policies of protecting victims from 
workplace harm and of reintegrating ex-convicts is for states to make it clear to 
employers when they will be liable for negligent hiring and when they can hire 
ex-convicts and avoid liability.”21  Professor Creed suggests that “courts 
should hold employers liable for negligent hiring when the employee’s 
criminal record directly relates to the harm” and that states enact “uniform 
requirements informing employers when they can hire an ex-convict and avoid 
liability.”22 
This Article will provide further recommendations on what those standards 
should look like—whether adopted by individual states or by the EEOC in 
providing a “safe haven” for employers who are negotiating the tension 
between avoiding adverse impact claims and liability for negligent hiring.  Part 
II discusses the manner by which courts already provide insight into standards 
for imposing liability in their review of negligent hiring claims.  Part III 
discusses Section 1983 claims as they pertain to this issue.  Part IV analyzes 
the existing guidance derived from claims under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, which excludes coverage of applicants and employees who 
 
 18. See, e.g., Timothy L. Creed, Negligent Hiring and Criminal Rehabilitation: Employing 
Ex-Convicts, Yet Avoiding Liability, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 183, 193–94 (2008). 
 19. Monique C. Lillard, Their Servants’ Keepers: Examining Employer Liability for the 
Crimes and Bad Acts of Employees, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 709, 744 (2007). 
 20. Id. at 745. 
 21. Creed, supra note 18, at 185. 
 22. Id. at 203, 204. 
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pose a “direct threat.”23  Since so many ex-offenders have a history of or a 
current mental illness,24 it is appropriate to look to these standards to determine 
whether these applicants would cause foreseeable injury.  This Article 
concludes by using the guidance derived from these three sources to advocate a 
standardized approach to employer hiring and retention liability. 
II.  CURRENT “GUIDANCE” FROM NEGLIGENT HIRING DECISIONS 
Negligent hiring claims typically are heard by state courts with little 
experience in employment discrimination claims.  Instead, state courts rely on 
general notions of tort liability to determine whether a claim should be sent to 
a jury or a jury verdict should be overturned.25  Unfortunately, the application 
of these general tort principles to claims of negligent hiring provide employers 
with little guidance on how to avoid liability for negligent hiring while also 
avoiding liability for adverse impact based on a more general ban on hiring ex-
offenders. 
The Restatement of Torts provides only general guidance for employers 
seeking to avoid liability for negligent hiring.  Under the Restatement, an 
employer may be liable for the harm caused by employees “who, to his 
knowledge, are in the habit of misconducting themselves in a manner 
dangerous to others.”26  In a claim of negligent hiring or retention against an 
employer, an injured person typically needs to prove the following: 
(1) the existence of an employment relationship; 
(2) the employee’s incompetence; 
(3) the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge of such incompetence; 
(4) the employee’s act or omission causing the plaintiff’s injuries; and 
(5) the employer’s negligence in hiring or retaining . . . the employee [w]as the 
proximate cause of [the] injuries.27 
Negligent hiring and retention cases depend on two fundamental 
elements—knowledge of the employer and the foreseeability of harm to third 
parties.28  Generally, the injured party must show that the employee who 
 
 23. Americans with Disabilities Act, tit. I, 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (2006). 
 24. See Steadman et al., supra note 6, at 764 (finding male prevalence rates between 14.5% 
and 17.1% and female rates between 31% and 34.3%).  See also JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 6, 
at 1 (estimating more than half of all inmates have mental health problems). 
 25. Amy D. Whitten & Deanne M. Mosley, Caught in the Crossfire: Employers’ Liability 
for Workplace Violence, 70 MISS. L.J. 505, 507 (2000). 
 26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 cmt. c (1965). 
 27. John E. Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, Whom to Hire: Rampant 
Misrepresentations of Credentials Mandate the Prudent Employer Make Informed Hiring 
Decisions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 827, 831 (2006) (citations omitted). 
 28. Cf. DiCosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 516 (N.J. 1982). 
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caused the injury had some propensity, proclivity, or course of conduct that 
should have put an employer on notice of the possible danger.29  Assuming that 
the employer has access to some information about the employee, the 
employer must determine whether that information would be sufficient to 
impose liability on that employer if that employee later causes harm.  To 
establish liability, the plaintiff must establish that the employer knew or should 
have known information that would have put the employer on notice of the 
possible danger to third parties.30 
General standards for tort liability provide little guidance for employers 
who are seeking to avoid liability for negligent hiring claims.  Tort liability is 
heavily fact dependent, and therefore, liability often depends on interpretations 
of those facts by a jury.  As of yet, courts have not ruled as a matter of law that 
employers are exempt from liability for negligent hiring.  For example, the 
New Mexico Court of Appeals refused to dismiss a claim for negligent hiring 
in part because it is not the court’s role to “usurp the fact-finding functions of 
the jury.”31 As another example, in Florida, the reasonableness of an 
employer’s decision to hire an employee for a position that could give them 
access to cause harm is a jury question.32 
Despite this inclination under general tort principles to let juries decide 
claims of negligent hiring, some claims are resolved on a motion to dismiss or 
to review a jury verdict, where the victim has failed to present sufficient 
evidence that the harm was foreseeable. 
A. Foreseeability 
Liability often turns on the issue of foreseeability.  In most states, 
foreseeability depends in large part on “the number and nature of prior acts of 
 
 29. See, e.g., Alpharetta First United Methodist Church v. Stewart, 472 S.E.2d 532, 536 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1996) (requiring that employer knew or should have known of employee’s dangerous 
propensities); Frye v. Am. Painting Co., 642 N.E.2d 995, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (stating 
knowledge of prior violence establishes constructive knowledge of violent propensity); Gomez v. 
City of New York, 758 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (App. Div. 2003) (finding employer must be on notice 
of relevant harmful propensities of employee who caused harm for liability). 
 30. See, e.g., Alpharetta, 472 S.E.2d at 536 (employer may not be held liable for negligent 
hiring or retention unless victim shows employer knew or should have known of employee’s 
dangerous propensities); Frye, 642 N.E.2d at 999 (employer may be held negligent if it retains 
employee it knew or should have known had a propensity for dangerous behavior); Gomez, 758 
N.Y.S.2d at 299 (“[R]ecovery on a negligent hiring and retention theory requires a showing that 
the employer was on notice of the relevant tortious propensities of the wrongdoing employee.”). 
 31. Lessard v. Coronado Paint & Decorating Ctr., 2007-NMCA-122, 142 N.M. 583, 597, 
168 P.3d 155, 169.  Missouri also reserves for juries findings related to the employer’s liability 
for negligent hiring.  See Gaines v. Monsanto Co., 655 S.W.2d 568, 571–72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).  
Cf. also Calkins v. Cox Estates, 792 P.2d 36, 42 n.6 (N.M. 1990) (contrasting landlord premises 
liability with leaving keys in a car, the theft of which as a matter of law is not foreseeable). 
 32. Abbott v. Payne, 457 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
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wrongdoing by the employee, and the nexus or similarity between the prior 
acts and the ultimate harm caused.”33  Other states rely more heavily on the 
“totality of the circumstances” which would indicate a propensity to cause 
harm.34 
State courts are inconsistent at best in applying these general standards of 
liability to employers who have hired dangerous employees.  The Seventh 
Circuit recently noted that “Indiana courts are somewhat unclear on the 
applicable standard for holding an employer liable for negligent hiring, 
retention, or supervision.”35  The inconsistencies across states are even greater.  
These cases point out the need for more specific standards for employers to be 
able to hire ex-offenders with the confidence that negligent hiring liability will 
not necessarily follow if that employee later causes harm. 
1. Prior Similar Incidents 
The foreseeability that some injury may occur due to the conduct of an ex-
offender is one element necessary to finding an employer liable.”36  For some 
courts, foreseeability can be established by “prior similar incidents” of the 
person who causes the harm, if the conviction was based on a prior incident 
that was sufficiently similar to the conduct in question.37  If there is sufficient 
nexus between the harm caused by the employee and even a single isolated 
incident, the employer may be held liable.38 
Thus, not all courts will necessarily find that all harm caused by an 
employee with a criminal record is foreseeable.  One Florida court explained 
the need to look at the connection between the previous crime and the harm 
caused by the employee: 
[T]here are many persons in Florida with prior criminal records who are now 
good citizens.  To say that an employer can never hire a person with a criminal 
record at the risk of being held liable for his tortious assault flies in the face of 
the premise that society must make a reasonable effort to rehabilitate those 
who have gone astray.39 
 
 33. Doe v. ATC, Inc., 624 S.E.2d 447, 450 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 34. Lingar v. Live-In Companions, Inc., 692 A.2d 61, 66 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); 
Staten v. Ohio Exterminating Co., 704 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
 35. Hansen v. Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 609 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(examining knowledge standards). 
 36. James R. Todd, Comment, “It’s Not My Problem”: How Workplace Violence and 
Potential Employer Liability Lead to Employment Discrimination of Ex-Convicts, 36 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 725, 753–54 (2004). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Doe, 624 S.E.2d at 451 (citing Doe v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 448 S.E.2d 564, 568 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 39. Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
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a. Particularity of the Harm 
Liability may require that the employee’s conduct was predictable, but the 
specific harm caused need not be foreseeable.  A Florida appellate court 
clarified that it is not necessary for the employer to foresee that the victim 
would be harmed in the exact way or to the same extent as actually occurred, if 
the employer was “able to foresee that some injury will likely result in some 
manner as a consequence of his negligent acts.”40  That court noted the opinion 
of an expert in criminology that “the best indicator of potentially-dangerous 
future conduct is the history of a person’s past conduct.”41  Similarly, the 
Illinois Court of Appeals has held that the employer need not foresee “the 
precise harm that did in fact occur” to be liable for the harm caused by its 
employee if, at the time of hiring, “a reasonably prudent person should have 
foreseen some harm to another as likely to occur.”42 
The dangerous employee’s prior conduct may be enough to impose 
liability on an employer if it is similar to the conduct that caused the harm in 
question.  However, there is a lack of clarity as to what level of similarity is 
necessary to impose liability on the employer.  For example, violent behavior 
by an employee generally is considered “predictable,” if that employee has 
been violent in the same way in the past.43 
One Massachusetts case provides an example of this foreseeability.  A bar 
employee’s prior convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon, assault with 
intent to commit rape, and kidnapping were enough to send to a jury the 
negligent hiring claim of a bar patron who was assaulted by the employee.44  In 
addition, violent behavior may be even more predictable depending on the 
particular work environment.45  The court reviewing the bar patron’s claim 
found that a jury “could infer that the atmosphere in which [the employee] 
worked was volatile and that there was a high potential for violence.”46 
Like this bar employee, previous violent behavior was also enough to deny 
summary judgment for a janitorial service company, based on the harm caused 
by a janitor employed to work at a university.47  That janitor’s assault on a 
 
 40. Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744, 757 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
(quoting Crislip v. Holland, 401 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). 
 41. Id. at 758. 
 42. Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 641 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (citing Slager v. 
Commonwealth Edison Co., 595 N.E.2d 1097 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)). 
 43. See, e.g., Foster v. Loft, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988) (contrasting 
predictability of assault by violent employee with dishonest employee). 
 44. Id. at 1312 n.5, 1313.  See also Valdez v. Warner, 742 P.2d 517, 520 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1987) (employer potentially liable for harm caused by bar employee who had previously engaged 
in assault). 
 45. See Foster, 526 N.E.2d at 1313. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Blair v. Defender Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623, 630 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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student was similar enough to his assault of a woman eleven months prior, 
which resulted in the issuance of a protective order against that janitor.48  The 
foreseeability of the harm was supported by the statement of the university’s 
Director of Housekeeping that “he would not have allowed [the employee] to 
perform janitorial services at [the university] had he known of [the 
employee’s] propensity for violence.”49 
Some connections between prior behavior and the act in question are fairly 
obvious.  The U.S. Army was denied summary judgment in a claim by the 
victim of a sexual assault by one of its soldiers.50  The soldier, prior to his 
employment by the Army, had committed rape as a juvenile and had felony 
convictions including burglary and unlawful use of a weapon, including one 
felony less than twelve months prior.51  The court relied in part on statistics 
showing the high rate of recidivism among convicted rapists.52  The court also 
considered his “pattern” of engaging in felonies, stating that “his rape 
conviction was not an isolated incident, but was part of a pattern of violent, 
felonious behavior by which he posed a danger to others.”53 
In another case involving an employee who assaulted a co-worker, the 
court found that previous felony convictions for sexual abuse in the first degree 
made it impossible for the court to dismiss the victim’s claim against his 
employer on the basis of foreseeability as a matter of law.54  Similarly, another 
New York court rejected the motion for summary judgment filed by the city 
employer of a parks employee who sexually assaulted a child in 1975, after 
having a series of convictions for “hoboing,” fighting, conspiracy to effect a 
prison break, assault, and breaking-and-entering, as well as convictions of 
attempted rape, robbery in the second degree, and grand larceny in the first 
degree, for which he was sentenced to a prison term of fifteen to thirty years in 
1946.55  The court refused to find that the 1975 assault was unforeseeable as a 
matter of law.56 
 
 48. Id. at 626. 
 49. Id. at 630. 
 50. Mulloy v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (D. Mass. 1996). 
 51. Id. at 1013 n.13. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  See also Frye v. Am. Painting Co., 642 N.E.2d 995, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) 
(remanding to jury case of employer negligence of hiring painter guilty of burglary and arson 
where the painter had prior convictions of burglary, theft, and arson); Oakley v. Flor-Shin, Inc., 
964 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (finding sexual assault by employee foreseeable based 
on previous convictions for burglary, theft, bail jumping, and an arrest three years earlier for 
criminal attempt to commit rape and for carrying a concealed weapon). 
 54. See Glover v. Augustine, 832 N.Y.S.2d 184 (App. Div. 2007). 
 55. Haddock v. City of New York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 990–92 (N.Y. 1990). 
 56. Id. at 991–92. 
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Negligent retention cases also provide guidance as to when past violent 
acts of employees show foreseeability, even if those previous acts did not 
result in a criminal conviction.57  For example, the physical threats and verbal 
abuse of a social worker by a corrections officer, both of whom worked at a 
prison, was potentially foreseeable where the officer had an “extensive 
disciplinary record,” including five reprimands for absenteeism or refusal to 
work overtime, insubordination and intentional disobedience as a recruit 
seventeen years prior, conduct unbecoming an employee (threatening to harm 
someone) eleven years prior, and verbal harassment three years prior.58  The 
court also found that the lack of a special investigation into this previous 
conduct showed a “deliberate indifference to the safety of [his coworkers] and 
contributed to unsafe and hostile working conditions.”59 
b. Foreseeability of Harm by Drivers 
Employers may also be held liable for harm caused by employees who 
operate a motor vehicle in a way that causes harm, particularly if the employee 
has a record of convictions based on his driving record.60  In Osborne, a 
trucking company was denied summary judgment where its commercial truck 
driver caused harm to passengers of another vehicle in 2004.61  The employer 
learned when it hired the driver that he had been convicted of driving under the 
influence twice, in 1975 and 1986, and his license had been suspended in 1986 
and 1994.62  In addition, the court considered other non-criminal behavior by 
this driver, some of which did not implicate his driving abilities, including the 
driver’s logbook which showed that there were eleven days in which the driver 
neglected to make any logbook entry; one of these missing days was just three 
days before the accident, and the driver had committed nine “critical” 
violations, including six for fourteen-plus hours on duty, and thirty-seven 
“other” violations including twelve for “speed over maximum miles per 
hour.”63  Based on this evidence, the court sent the claim of negligent hiring 
back to the trial court.64 
 
 57. See, e.g., Denis v. City of Newark, 704 A.2d 1003, 1007–08 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1998) (dismissed on other grounds) (negligent retention claim of assault victim supported by 
police officer’s three previous assaults on citizens and nine violations of police regulations over 
ten years). 
 58. Hoag v. Brown, 935 A.2d 1218, 1230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
 59. Id. at 1231. 
 60. See, e.g., Osborne v. Pinsonneault, No. 4:07-CV-002, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29695, at 
*10–11 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 10, 2008). 
 61. Id. at *9–10. 
 62. Id. at *3. 
 63. Id. at *4. 
 64. Id. at *11. 
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Liability for driving employees does not necessarily depend on an exact 
match between the harm caused and their previous driving infractions.  
Another trucking company was denied summary judgment where the driver 
who caused the harm by driving his truck in an unsafe manner and the 
employer knew he had an “unsatisfactory” safety record and had been involved 
in a motor vehicle accident with his previous employer.65  Even though the 
previous accident involved hitting a low bridge, whereas the harm in question 
occurred due to the driver’s recklessness in icy road conditions, a jury could 
conclude that the employer had reason to know at the time he was hired that 
this driver could cause harm through his driving.66 
These cases suggest that a victim’s claim may at least go to a jury if the 
employee’s previous conduct suggests a propensity to commit the harmful act. 
c. Past Crimes Unrelated to Subsequent Crimes 
Similarly, a Minnesota court upheld a jury’s verdict of negligent hiring by 
a contractor whose employee robbed and assaulted the contractor’s clients.67  
For example, one court sent to the jury a negligent hiring and retention claim 
against a health care provider alleging liability for the employee’s fatal 
injection of a patient with heroin.68  The employee had stolen a patient’s 
medication and had a long criminal record including aggravated assault and 
armed robbery—facts sufficient to support foreseeability.69 
Similarly, a jury verdict against a contractor was upheld based on a 
painter’s robbery and assault of homeowners where the contractor had been 
hired, based on the painter’s history of chemical dependence and recent theft of 
another client’s computer.70  The jury was justified in finding that the assault 
was foreseeable, even though the painter had no history of violence, based on 
the painter’s history of chemical dependence and recent theft of another 
client’s computer.71  The employer could have foreseen that the painter, “given 
 
 65. Johnson v. USA Truck, Inc., No. 06-CV-00227-EWN-MEH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
63007, at *9 (D. Colo. Aug. 27, 2007). 
 66. Id. at *10.  For an example of a negligent retention case, see Oaks v. Wiley Sanders 
Truck Lines, Inc., No. 07-45-KSF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56448, at *12 (E.D. Ky. July 22, 2008) 
(employer potentially liable for retaining driver who ran red light and had been cited for speeding 
a few months earlier). 
 67. See, e.g., Spencer, v. Health Force, Inc., 2005-NMSC-002, 137 N.M. 64, 107 P.3d 504, 
511. 
 68. Id. at 107 P.3d 504, 511. 
 69. Id. at 107 P.3d 504, 506, 510. 
 70. Hines v. Aandahl Constr. Co., No. A05-1634, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at 
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2006). 
 71. Id. at *4. 
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access to private residences, could not only burglarize them but also injure 
residents.”72 
Some courts will hold an employer liable even if the employee’s previous 
illegal behavior is not directly related to the harmful acts in question but 
merely indicates a propensity to commit such acts.  If an employee possesses 
attributes that would generally make him or her more dangerous, an employer 
may be liable to a victim of that employee’s actions if those attributes 
contributed to the harm.73  For example, the past acts of an apartment 
complex’s maintenance employee were sufficiently related to the murder of a 
resident where the employee had prior felony convictions for rape at 
knifepoint, armed robbery, and three residential burglaries.74  The court found 
that “[t]hese incidents show a propensity for breaking into private property and 
violence,” and therefore a violent attack was therefore foreseeable.75 
Some courts will send a claim to a jury even if the employee’s prior 
criminal behavior is not related to the acts causing the harm by the employee.  
For example, the employer of a supervisor who had an extensive criminal 
record was denied summary judgment on a claim that it was liable for 
negligently hiring the supervisor, who later harassed and threatened a female 
employee.76  The supervisor had served prison time for bank robbery, had been 
arrested for shoplifting, drug possession, solicitation to buy drugs, disorderly 
conduct, and solicitation of a sex act, had admitted to using at least seven 
different aliases, was involved in some physical altercations at work, and 
participated in a doctor supervised methadone program.77  The court concluded 
that the supervisor should not have been placed in a position of authority given 
his record and ongoing offenses, since based on the supervisor’s “checkered 
past,” it was “foreseeable that he may have a propensity to commit violent 
crimes.”78 
Some courts will allow a claim even based on more temporally remote 
criminal behavior of an employee who subsequently causes harm.  One trial 
court allowed the jury to consider a store security guard’s criminal record that 
included theft, grand larceny, burglary, and a bogus check charge for the 
limited purpose of showing that the employer failed to exercise reasonable care 
and was reckless in employing an armed security guard who shot a customer at 
 
 72. Id. at *6.  It should be noted that the crime occurred after the employee was fired, but 
that because of the negligent hiring, the employee was able to access the home.  Id. at *5. 
 73. See TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings, 590 S.E.2d 807, 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Prothro v. Nat’l Bankcard Corp., No. 04-C-7857, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57553, at *23–
25 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2006). 
 77. Id. at *3. 
 78. Id. at *25–26. 
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the store.79  The court admitted this record even though the most recent 
conviction had occurred thirteen years before he was hired.80 
Remote events have similarly been relied upon to establish foreseeability 
in negligent retention claims.  A police department which had recorded several 
instances of inattentiveness, carelessness, and disregard for police 
requirements and mandatory procedures regarding the handling of firearms 
was potentially liable for the subsequent self-inflicted harm to a child who was 
given access to the officer’s firearm, since some of the officer’s previous 
behavior “directly endangered the public.”81  The court considered these 
infractions even though one had occurred nine years earlier because similar 
incidents of misconduct had occurred within the last year.82  The court found 
that, based on this previous conduct, a jury could find that it was foreseeable 
that the officer “would cause personal harm to another through the negligent 
performance of his duties in future employment as a police officer.”83 
Harassing behavior by an employee may also be foreseeable based on an 
employee’s past conduct, even if that conduct did not result in a criminal 
conviction.  An employer was not granted summary judgment in a 
discrimination claim where an employee engaged in discriminatory treatment 
by calling someone a “Nazi” with the employer’s knowledge.84  The court held 
that the “use of the term Nazi could connote approval of the intolerant attitudes 
associated with the Nazis” based on its conclusion that “individuals and groups 
associated with Nazi ideology harbor racial animus.”85 
Even an overall poor safety record could support liability for harm caused 
by a driving employee, despite a lack of criminal convictions.  A company that 
hired a trucking contractor, for example, was denied summary judgment in a 
claim in which their contracted driver was involved in an accident where the 
trucking contractor had received a conditional safety rating based, in part, upon 
driver hiring issues, low driver scores, and vehicle safety concerns.86  In 
addition, the harm-causing driver was inexperienced, was paired with a driver 
whose commercial driver’s license was recently suspended, and the crash 
report stated that inexperience could have been a factor in the accident.87 
 
 79. Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173, 177–79 (Tex. App. 1979). 
 80. Id. at 177. 
 81. Govea v. City of Norcross, 608 S.E.2d 677, 685, 687 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 685. 
 84. Bowers v. Am. Heart Ass’n, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1370–71 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
 85. Id. at 1370.  Cf. Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 256 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 
2001) (holding that racist remarks by employee were foreseeable where he reportedly engaged in 
similar conduct with other customers in past). 
 86. Jones v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 630, 648 (W.D. Va. 2008). 
 87. Id.  See also Raleigh v. Performance Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 130 P.3d 1011, 1014 
n.3, 1018 n.8 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (suggesting that employer’s liability for harm from driving 
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An employee’s past behavior—for which he may or may not have been 
convicted—may also be enough to impose liability on an employer who should 
have foreseen the employee’s character flaws that resulted in his or her 
harmful conduct as an employee.  For example, an employee with a propensity 
for lying, demonstrated by signature forgery, convictions for passing 
insufficient funds checks, and lying to officers of that company about 
obtaining a license, was enough to render foreseeable its employee’s 
defrauding of a customer.88 
d. Evidence of past bad behavior may be sufficient 
In a case involving the sexual assault of an inmate by a Sheriff’s 
Department transport officer, summary judgment for the county was denied 
where the assaulting officer had previously worked in law enforcement.89  
Representatives of his previous employers submitted statements that the officer 
“had a tendency to insult and cause stress to members of the female sex”, that 
he had been the subject of allegations indicating that he “could not be trusted 
around teenage girls”, that he had made “lewd statements to [high school] 
girls”, and that he allegedly sexually harassed a woman and assaulted her with 
a nightstick.90  This information prompted the court to conclude that the officer 
had a “history of crude and insulting behavior towards women” and had been 
the subject of “allegations of sexual improprieties.”91 
The employment history of a police officer also prevented the dismissal of 
a claim by a woman who was tackled and dragged to his police car after he 
responded to a complaint involving the victim’s child.92  The officer had been 
cited for insubordination and “volatile behavior,” and there was evidence that 
he had used excessive force against both inmates and citizens.93 
Prior behavior of police officers has been viewed as sufficient for police 
departments to foresee even sexual assaults committed by its officers.  In one 
case, a Georgia appellate court denied a police department’s motion for 
summary judgment where an officer had “pled guilty to making harassing 
 
accident could have been question of fact for jury based on two prior accidents that were 
employee’s fault, if employee had been driving as part of his employment). 
 88. Pruitt v. Pavelin, 685 P.2d 1347, 1350, 1354 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). 
 89. Jones v. Stoneking, Civ. No. 02-4131 (JNE/RLE), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3096, at *2, 
*22 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 2005). 
 90. Id. at *10–11. 
 91. Id. at *9.  See also Malorney v. B & L Motor Freight, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1086, 1087, 1089 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (denying summary judgment where truck driver who raped hitchhiker had 
history of violent sex-related crimes including aggravated sodomy of two teenage hitchhikers two 
years earlier). 
 92. Arnold v. Wilder, No. 3:04CV-649-S, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86798, at *2, *4, *15 
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 27, 2006). 
 93. Id. at *15. 
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phone calls to a [girlfriend]” and had been investigated for a citizen complaint 
regarding three sexually inappropriate encounters involving female citizens, 
where an internal investigation concluded that this behavior was indicative of 
sexual deviancy.94  The Georgia Supreme Court later clarified that an injured 
party need not necessarily establish the employee’s “propensity to commit the 
tortious or criminal act that caused the plaintiff’s injury.”95  Liability may be 
established if the employee “posed a risk of harm to others where it is 
reasonably foreseeable from the employee’s ‘tendencies’ or propensities that 
the employee could cause the type of harm sustained by the plaintiff.”96 
Similarly, a children’s home was not entitled to summary judgment on the 
claim of a child/resident who was the victim of acts of sexual misconduct by 
one of the home’s employees, where that employee gave, over an extended 
period of time, expensive gifts and cash to the resident and had him on regular 
overnight visits to his residence, both of which were violations of the home’s 
rules and regulations.97  The court also considered the fact that the employee 
had expressed some dismay regarding the degree of accountability required of 
him and with the expectation that he communicate with the victim’s social 
worker.98  These cases demonstrate that some courts will look beyond past 
criminal convictions in finding foreseeability if there is some direct connection 
between the employee’s past behavior and their activities that resulted in harm 
as an employee. 
2. Lack of Liability Based on Past Conduct 
In contrast to the cases where an employer was at least potentially liable 
for harm caused by an employee, other courts have been reluctant to hold an 
 
 94. Harper v. City of E. Point, 515 S.E.2d 623, 625 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 95. Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 596 S.E.2d 604, 606 (Ga. 2004). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Peter T. v. Children’s Vill., Inc., 819 N.Y.S.2d 44 (App. Div. 2006). 
 98. Id.  For further examples where continuing bad conduct resulted in foreseeable harm by 
employees, see Ten Broeck DuPont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 736–37 (Ky. 2009) 
(negligent retention claim not dismissed on directed verdict where hospital knew of previous 
inappropriate sexual conduct and three convictions by employee who sexually assaulted a 
patient); Doe v. Centennial Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, No. A04-413, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 
1427, at *11–12 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2004) (finding school potentially liable for sexual 
battery by teacher on student where teacher was subject of previous complaint by aide); 
deRochemont v. D & M Printing of Minneapolis, Inc., No. C2-94-169, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 
929, at *5–6 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1994) (upholding verdict for negligent retention based on 
employee’s harassment of coworker and history of using vulgar language, display and discussion 
of explicit photographs, and description of wife’s sexual activities); Hoke v. May Dep’t Stores 
Co., 891 P.2d 686, 688, 691 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing negligent retention claim where 
security guard had sex with minor accused of shoplifting after previous allegation of sexually 
assaulting another shoplifting suspect, because investigation into previous incident may have 
been inadequate). 
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employer liable even where its employee who caused the harm had engaged in 
other inappropriate or even criminal behavior in the past.  The Supreme Court 
of South Dakota, for example, refused to hold an employer liable for an assault 
committed by an employee a prior conviction for resisting arrest in connection 
with a domestic violence situation, noting that the eight years since the 
conviction and a lack of violent behavior in the workplace made the event 
unforeseeable.99  The court also discounted the employee’s arrests (without 
convictions) for assault, grand theft, and numerous traffic violations.100  The 
court was concerned that liability in this situation “would deter employers from 
hiring workers with a criminal record and ‘offend our civilized concept that 
society must make a reasonable effort to rehabilitate those who have erred so 
they can be assimilated into the community.’”101 
Unlike the cases outlined above where an employer was potentially liable 
if the assaultive employee had a history of violent behavior, one trucking 
company was relieved of liability on summary judgment despite its employee’s 
violent record.102  The employee, a driver, had prior convictions of arson and 
aggravated assault; later, while on a driving assignment, he raped and 
murdered a motorist. 103  The employer may have known that a former 
girlfriend of the driver alleged that he assaulted her, but her complaint was 
subsequently dismissed.104  Additionally, the employer had been informed that 
at a younger age, the driver had been placed in a behavioral health hospital 
because of a drug addiction and a “hot temper.”105  Despite this history, the 
court concluded that “no reasonable juror could conclude from that 
information that [the employer] knew or should have known that [the driver] 
was unfit for his job as a long-haul truck driver.”106 
Similarly, an Ohio court refused to hold an employer liable for the sexual 
assault of a coworker committed by an employee who had a record of indecent 
exposure at a city park.107  The court noted that the exposure was not a 
“physical assault” and that even the police detective testified that “it would be 
quite a stretch” to predict the sexual assault based on the exposure that 
occurred six years earlier.108  The court also mentioned that while the 
employee who committed the assault had taken leave and was treated for a 
 
 99. Kirlin v. Halverson, 758 N.W.2d 436, 453 (S.D. 2008). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 454 (quoting Yunker v. Honeywell, Inc., 496 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Minn. 1993)). 
 102. See Stalbosky v. Belew, 205 F.3d 890, 892 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 896. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Prewitt v. Alexson Servs., Inc., No. CA2007-09-218, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3612, at 
*3 n.3, *19 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2008). 
 108. Id. at *17 n.8. 
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mental illness, the employee was cleared by his doctor to return to work, and 
that even the victim had not seen signs that he was “mentally unstable or 
threatening in any way.”109 
As with past crimes that do not indicate a propensity for violence, past 
violations arising from operating a motor vehicle may not impose liability on 
an employer.  For example, a university was not liable when an intoxicated 
employee caused an accident while operating a university vehicle that he 
accessed through his employment.110  Although the employee did not possess a 
valid driver’s license and had two DUI convictions, the court held that the 
accident was unforeseeable because his “employment history showed he had 
been a model employee, never had consumed alcohol at work or reported for 
work intoxicated, never had been in any motor vehicle accidents, never had 
taken any item from any employer without permission, and had no record of 
theft.”111  The court focused on the notion that the theft was unforeseeable, 
even though the use of alcohol while driving was consistent with past behavior 
and may have been more directly related to the accident than the theft.112 
Often, unrelated criminal offenses are insufficient to establish liability.  
For example, a company that provided airport services to privately owned 
airplanes was not liable for harm caused by an employee after the employee 
took its plane for a “joy ride,” even though the employee had a military 
criminal record for a drug offense.113  This record, even combined with 
employee reprimands for failing to ground airplanes when refueling, being late 
and taking off from work without permission, were not enough to make the 
harm foreseeable.114  Likewise, an employer was not responsible for a burglary 
committed by its painters who had criminal records that included spousal 
battery, driving with a suspended license, possession of drugs, reckless driving, 
fleeing police, and driving with an expired license.115  The court concluded that 
these crimes were insufficiently related to the burglary to hold the employers 
liable for negligent hiring.116 
Even though some trucking companies have been held liable for harm 
caused by drivers with less than perfect driving records, at least one trucking 
company avoided liability for negligently hiring and retaining an employee 
who was driving within the speed limit when another truck entered the lane 
 
 109. Id. at *18–19. 
 110. Interim Pers. of Cent. Va., Inc. v. Messer, 559 S.E.2d 704, 705, 708–09 (Va. 2002). 
 111. Id. at 708. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Island City Flying Serv. v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 585 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1991). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Muegge v. Heritage Oaks Golf & Country Club, Inc., No. 8:05-cv-354-T-24 MAP, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21271, at *19–22 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2006). 
 116. Id. at *22. 
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and caused the employee to strike the victim’s car.117  Neither the employee’s 
previous driving under the influence conviction nor his running of a red light 
rendered his collision foreseeable, since neither of those illegal behaviors were 
the cause of the accident in question.118  Although the driver may have been 
driving too fast for the rainy conditions, his previous violations did not involve 
reckless driving or unsafe driving in bad weather.119  The court also considered 
that the red light violation occurred in 1995, and the speeding tickets were 
received in 1995, 1997, and 2001 respectively, whereas the employee 
otherwise had a clean driving record until the collision in 2002.120 
Like this truck driver, an employer in Montana was not liable for the harm 
caused by an employee in a motor vehicle accident, even though the driver had 
a record of several speeding tickets.121  Since the driver was not speeding when 
the accident occurred, the employer was not liable for negligent retention 
despite its prior knowledge of those speeding tickets.122 
Like these employers, a gas station was not liable for its cashier’s shooting 
and killing of a customer and his son, despite his criminal record, where the 
previous crimes were non-violent, and a previous shooting incident did not 
result in criminal charges.123  The employer knew about the prior convictions 
but believed that they were irrelevant to his duties, since most of the clerk’s 
contact with customers was oral communication through an intercom and/or 
cash drawer located in a bulletproof gazebo.124  These courts seem to require 
an almost exact match between the employee’s previous behavior and the 
inappropriate or criminal behavior that caused the harm in question. 
To hold an employer liable, often courts rely on the standard that the 
previous criminal conduct must be related to the current misconduct, even if 
the previous conviction may demonstrate some character flaw unrelated to the 
harm caused.  For example, a Michigan court dismissed a negligent hiring 
claim against an employer based on its employee’s sexual assault despite the 
employee’s prior conviction for fraudulent use of a financial device, since that 
conviction was not a predictor of the criminal sexual conduct.125 
 
 117. Estate of Presley v. CCS of Conway, No. 3:03CV-117-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9583, 
at *23–24 (W.D. Ky. May 18, 2004). 
 118. Id. at *22–23. 
 119. Id. at *23. 
 120. Id. at *20, *23–24. 
 121. Hoffman v. Austin, 147 P.3d 177, 181–82 (Mont. 2006), overruled on other grounds by 
Giambra v. Kelsey, 162 P.3d 134 (Mont. 2007). 
 122. Id. at 182. 
 123. Butler v. Hurlbut, 826 S.W.2d 90, 92–93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
 124. Id. at 93. 
 125. Doe v. Doe I, No. 285655, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 1915, at *16 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 
17, 2009). 
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Similarly, another employer was found not liable for negligently hiring an 
employee who assaulted a coworker.126  The employee in question had a record 
of larceny and breaking and entering.127  The Magistrate judge stated that 
“[t]his information, standing alone, is insufficient to put [the employer] on 
notice that [the assaultive employee] was in the habit of misconducting himself 
in a manner dangerous to others.”128  The district court later agreed that the 
record did not indicate that the employer “knew or had reason to know at the 
time of hiring that [the employee] would be dangerous to women or that any 
assault by him would be foreseeable.”129 
A prior incident by an employee in different circumstances also may not be 
enough to make subsequent misconduct foreseeable, even if the conduct is 
similar.  A court found an employer could not have foreseen that a bus driver 
would inappropriately touch and make persistent sexual comments to a rider 
with a disability130 even though that driver had harassed a co-worker when 
giving her a ride to work by grabbing and trying to kiss her and making by 
inappropriate sexual comments to her while in the presence of customers.131  
The court concluded that the prior misconduct by the driver toward his co-
worker lacked “a sufficient nexus” to the sexual assault on the rider.132 
Similarly, inappropriate sexual behavior toward other females may not 
make the sexual assault of a different victim predictable.  For example, an 
employer was granted summary judgment against the negligent supervision 
claim of a twelve-year-old victim of sexual assault by one of its employees, 
even though the employer knew of the employee’s tendencies to engage in 
lewd and sexual behavior with the female employees on the premises during 
business hours.133  Three female employees had quit after being fondled and 
sexually propositioned by the employee.134  Yet the risks shown by this 
behavior did not extend to the employee’s assault of someone who was neither 
employee nor customer when the business was closed—the “connection 
 
 126. Gainey v. Kingston Plantation, No. 4:06-3373-RBH-TER, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34014, at *19 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2008). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at *19. 
 129. Gainey v. Kingston Plantation, No. 4:06-3373-RBH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20396, at 
*8 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2008).  See also Se. Apartments Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 513 S.E.2d 395, 
396–97 (Va. 1999) (holding it unforeseeable that apartment maintenance supervisor would enter 
apartment and touch resident while drunk, based on history of writing bad checks, suspicion that 
he had alcohol problem and was attracted to single women, and that other employees found him 
“obnoxious”). 
 130. Doe v. ATC, Inc., 624 S.E.2d 447, 448 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 131. Id. at 449. 
 132. Id. at 451. 
 133. Keller v. Koca, 111 P.3d 445, 446 (Colo. 2005). 
 134. Id. at 450. 
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between the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s dangerous propensities 
and the harm caused” was insufficient.135 
Unlike the decisions discussed above that considered an employee’s 
related misconduct as an employee, other courts have been unwilling to impose 
liability on an employer based on such misconduct.  For example, a school 
district was relieved of liability for negligently hiring and retaining a high 
school teacher who had inappropriate interactions with a student, even though 
the school district may have known that the teacher had married a former 
student.136  This knowledge alone did not “put the school district on notice that 
[his] relationship with [his wife/former student] was improper, that he was in a 
habit of misconducting himself, or that he otherwise represented a threat to his 
students.”137  Similarly, another school district was not liable for negligently 
hiring a bus driver who committed sexual abuse, even though that driver had a 
history of tardiness, absenteeism and irregular schedules.138 
Even employers of employees who engage in sexual assault may be able to 
escape liability in some courts, despite the employee’s inappropriate behavior 
towards the same victim in the past.  For example, an employer was not liable 
when an employee raped a co-worker, despite the employee’s history of using 
crude and offensive language towards the victim, where the words “did not 
clearly and unmistakably threaten particular criminal activity that would have 
put a reasonable employer on notice of an imminent risk of harm to a specific 
victim.”139  The court noted that “[n]ot even [the victim] believed she was 
being threatened with potential rape;” he had never even touched her in the 
past.140  Liability was inappropriate since “‘not every infirmity of character’ is 
sufficient to forewarn the employer of its employee’s violent propensities.”141 
The court was concerned that liability based only on the offensive language 
“would invite burdensome, over-inclusive employer regulation of employee 
workplace speech.”142 
Like the employer of the rapist, an employer was not liable for a boating 
accident caused by its engineer taking a company boat out to transport personal 
guests, after disobeying a direct order, even though that employee had been 
 
 135. Id.  See also Reed v. Kelly, 37 S.W.3d 274, 276 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (finding history of 
slapping wife and engaging in a fistfight with a coworker insufficient as matter of law to create 
nexus with sexual assault). 
 136. Hansen v. Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 611 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Giraldi v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 62, 665 N.E.2d 332, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
 139. Brown v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Mich. 2007). 
 140. Id. at 318 n.24, 319. 
 141. Id. at 319 (quoting Hersh v. Kentfield Builders, Inc, 189 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Mich. 
1971)).       
 142. Id. 
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stopped twice and ticketed once for speeding in the harbor area.143  Similarly, 
the employer of a delivery person who struck a pedestrian while riding a 
bicycle was not liable for the injuries he caused, even though the employer had 
a policy against employees using bicycles, and the employee had been 
discharged at least twice, possibly for using a bicycle in the past, where there 
was no evidence that his possible past use of a bicycle had caused harm.144 
These cases demonstrate that previous bad behavior may be insufficient to 
make the employee’s harmful act foreseeable, even if the behavior indicates a 
general propensity to engage in such behavior. 
An employer may not be liable even if the conduct in question did not 
cause physical harm.  For example, the defamatory statements of a radio 
station employee were not foreseeable, despite his history of “offensive” and 
“outrageous conduct” on the air.145  The court was concerned that basing 
employer liability on prior speech that was “‘outrageous,’ but nondefamatory 
. . . would run afoul of [F]irst [A]mendment principles” since liability on a 
media employer would make it “reluctant to hire controversial broadcasters or 
reporters.”146 
Like the radio host’s prior bad behavior, an employee’s “FEAR ME” tattoo 
was not enough to impose liability on a restaurant based on that employee’s 
assault of a customer.147  The employer’s liability was also undermined by the 
employee’s lack of any prior work history of an invalid nature, any prior 
criminal history, any pending charges or bad references, or even any violent 
tendencies after getting the tattoo.148  Like the tattoo, an employee’s admitted 
membership in a street gang prior to the start of employment, an arrest for 
loitering (under an ordinance later found unconstitutional), and one suspension 
from high school for missing class were not found to be enough to put an 
 
 143. Favorito v. Pannell, 27 F.3d 716, 718–19 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 144. Detone v. Bullit Courier Serv., Inc., 528 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (App. Div. 1988) (finding no 
evidence that the employee had been discharged for anything more serious than tardiness). 
 145. Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898, 906 (Ill. 1998).  Prior behavior included 
obstructing traffic, causing listeners to overpay tolls by broadcasting that the Golden Gate Bridge 
toll had risen, hanging a “Welcome to Chicago” banner at San Francisco International Airport, 
dropping cinder blocks off a California overpass, calling a local newscaster “fat” and 
“unprofessional” over the public airwaves; causing listeners to flood a college library by 
announcing that $500 was hidden in a book; and declaring “Alzheimer’s Awareness Day” and 
visiting a nursing home to mock the elderly while on air.  Id. at 904. 
 146. Id. at 906–07.  See also Heller v. Patwil Homes, Inc., 713 A.2d 105, 109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1998) (real estate company not liable for hiring sales manager with record of securities fraud who 
later defrauded customers). 
 147. Dixon v. CEC Entm’t, Inc., No. A-2010-06T1, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2875, at 
*33, *43 (N.J. Super. Aug. 6, 2008). 
 148. Id. at *33. 
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employer on notice that an employee who later assaulted a customer was unfit 
to work as a cook or that he was a danger to customers.149 
Prior bad behavior indicating a propensity for sexual improprieties still 
may be insufficient to establish foreseeability.  For example, the previous 
inappropriate conduct of a minister was not enough to hold a church liable for 
the sexual relationship he later had with the wife of a congregation member he 
was counseling.150  The alleged prior conduct included assaulting a young man 
by grabbing his testicles, trying to date a female parishioner while he was 
married, touching another young parishioner on the breast, and increasing the 
pay of the church pianist in violation of church policy.151 
Following that same reasoning, a federal court in Montana held that a city 
was not liable by negligent retention for harm caused by the excessive use of 
force or denial of medical treatment overseen by an officer who had a history 
of inappropriately taking pictures of female victims, keeping those pictures in 
his locker, lying to investigators in his previous city of employment, and 
failing to account for money he received from a victim.152 
a. Inconsistency in Approach 
These cases illustrate how differently a court may interpret previous 
misconduct by an employee who causes harm.  Some courts consider fairly 
unrelated past criminal behavior in holding an employer liable for negligent 
hiring.153  Other courts discount the previous “bad behavior” even if it involved 
criminal convictions, and require almost an exact repetition of that previous 
behavior, sometimes with the same victim, to hold an employer liable for 
hiring that employee.154 
As shown by cases involving an employee’s previous criminal conduct or 
bad behavior, some courts will impose liability on an employer if there is even 
a remote connection between the previous behavior and the conduct causing 
harm as an employee.155  Yet the decisions outlined above demonstrate that 
other courts will not impose liability and will not even send the negligent 
hiring claim to a jury unless there is an exact match between the previous 
crime or bad behavior and the current conduct that resulted in harm.156 
For an employer trying to decide whether to hire an applicant with a 
criminal record, these cases provide little guidance as to whether the employer 
 
 149. Montgomery v. Petty Mgmt. Corp., 752 N.E.2d 596, 600–01 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
 150. Poole v. N. Ga. Conf. of the Methodist Church, Inc., 615 S.E.2d 604, 606–07 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
 151. Id. at 607. 
 152. Peschel v. City of Missoula, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1168, 1170 (D. Mont. 2009). 
 153. See, e.g., Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173, 177–79 (Tex. App. 1979). 
 154. See, e.g., Kirlin v. Halverson, 758 N.W.2d 436, 453 (S.D. 2008). 
 155. See, e.g., Heng Or v. Edwards, 818 N.E.2d 163, 169 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). 
 156. See, e.g., Kirlin, 758 N.W.2d at 453. 
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could be liable in the future if that employee later causes harm.  In addition, the 
approach of the courts in these cases provides no defense for an employer 
influenced by other factors that show that the employee will not cause harm in 
the future, such as evidence of the applicant’s rehabilitation. 
B. Totality of Circumstances 
Unlike the courts that focus on the employee’s prior bad behavior and how 
closely it relates to the harm caused, some courts apply a “totality of the 
circumstances” test.157  Under this test, foreseeability may be established based 
on several factors, including the time that has passed since the conviction, 
mitigating factors, and the number of previous convictions.158 Unfortunately, 
many courts applying the totality of circumstances test in negligent hiring or 
retention claims have not provided specific guidelines for employers to 
determine how much investigation is required to avoid a finding of 
foreseeability.159  If a claim survives a motion to dismiss, liability may be 
imposed by a jury without an employer knowing the specific reason why.160  
Rather than guessing how this standard will be applied, employers tend to err 
on the side of rejecting applicants with criminal convictions.161 
In contrast to the emphasis on the implications of particular past criminal 
behavior, a totality approach will use other information about the employee to 
determine if the employer should have foreseen the harm.  Professor Lillard 
offers support for a totality of circumstances approach: 
Considerable harm might be deterred with more careful hiring.  On the other 
hand, considerable over-deterrence might occur.  Small, irrelevant, or dated 
crime records might render many applicants virtually unemployable. . . .  This 
over-deterrence could lead to increased unemployment, the loss of good 
workers, invasion of the privacy of applicants and employees, and more 
wrongful termination law suits.162 
Lillard notes that even though the reintegration of parolees into society is 
important, it should be undertaken using due care and diligence on the part of 
employers and others involved in the process.163  In her conclusion, Lillard 
suggests that employers must “hire with care,” and should consider “signs of 
 
 157. See Todd, supra note 36, at 754. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Stephen J. Beaver, Comment, Beyond the Exclusivity Rule: Employer’s Liability for 
Workplace Violence, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 103, 110 (1997) (citing Katrin U. Byford, Comment, The 
Quest for the Honest Worker: A Proposal for Regulation of Integrity Testing, 49 S.M.U. L. REV. 
329, 360 (1996)). 
 160. See Todd, supra note 36, at 753–54. 
 161. Id. at 754. 
 162. Lillard, supra note 19, at 746. 
 163. Id. at 763. 
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proclivities to do harm” given the background of the applicant, the 
vulnerability of the people with whom the employee will come in contact, and 
the nature of the work.164 
The Colorado Supreme Court provided some guidance for applying a 
totality of circumstances approach when it held that liability may be predicated 
on the employer’s hiring of a person where the employer believes that the 
person by “reason of some attribute of character or prior conduct, would create 
an undue risk of harm to others in carrying out his or her employment 
responsibilities.”165  The court cited the following as examples of evidence of a 
character attribute or prior conduct that might warrant further inquiry: 
an arrest without a conviction, an arrest for a felony followed by 
nonprosecution, an arrest for a serious crime followed by an acquittal or a 
conviction of a minor offense, [and] an old conviction for a felony or 
misdemeanor resulting in a successful period of probation or parole without 
further recidivism.166 
This principle was applied in a case involving abuse of a parishioner by a 
priest while engaged in pastoral counseling.167  That court noted that the 
church’s liability could be based on “character attributes of the employee” 
rather than only the past acts of the employee.168  The church was potentially 
liable where a psychological report concluded that the priest had a “sexual 
identification ambiguity” and “another psychological report indicated that [he] 
had a problem with depression and suffered from low self-esteem,” given 
additional evidence that “clergy who have sexual relationships with their 
parishioners do so partially as a result of suffering from depression and low 
self-esteem.”169 
Mirroring the Colorado Supreme Court’s reasoning, the Kansas Court of 
Appeals stated that under the totality of circumstances approach, a court looks 
for a causal relationship between the dangerous propensity or quality of the 
employee and the injuries suffered by the third person.170  Liability can follow 
where a known propensity or quality gives the employer “reason to believe that 
an undue risk of harm exists to others as a result of the continued employment 
of that employee; and the harm which results [is] within the risk created by the 
known propensity for the employer to be liable.”171  The Kansas Supreme 
 
 164. Id. at 765. 
 165. Connes v. Molalla Trans. Sys., Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Colo. 1992) (en banc). 
 166. Id. at 1323 n.3. 
 167. Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 327 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). 
 168. Id. at 327 n.21. 
 169. Id. at 328. 
 170. Hollinger v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training Sch. for Nurses, 578 P.2d 1121, 1127 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1978). 
 171. Id. 
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Court later explained that an employer could be liable if a known risk exists 
because of the “quality of the employee,” and the employer had reason to 
conclude that the employee would likely cause harm.172 
In some circumstances, the crimes committed may overcome the other 
positive factors, under a totality of circumstances test, to support an employer’s 
liability.  This application of the totality of circumstances standard mirrors the 
approach of the courts outlined above which rely only on the employee’s past 
convictions or bad behavior.  For example, it was potentially foreseeable that a 
custodian for an at-risk-youth program would attempt to sexually assault a 
youth, where the employee had previous criminal convictions for armed 
robbery, assault, theft, burglary, and possession of a controlled substance.173  
The court refused to find as a matter of law that the assault was not 
foreseeable, even where another employee (his brother) had recommended 
him, the employer’s interviewer believed after the interview that the custodian 
would be a “good, hard worker,” and the employee had received a positive 
performance after he was hired.174 
Even without a past criminal record, a negative employment history can 
sometimes support a finding of employer liability under the totality approach.  
For example, a retirement home was denied summary judgment when it had 
been informed by a previous employer that the applicant “had some difficulty 
handling some employee issues.”175  According to the court, a jury could 
conclude that if the employer had inquired further about the meaning of that 
comment, the previous employer would have revealed the applicant’s prior 
sexual misconduct with his previous co-workers.176 
Negative personal characteristics can also support an employer’s liability, 
even if the employer relied on the applicant’s positive attributes.  For example, 
a furniture company was potentially liable for the harm caused by a deliverer 
despite his past record of employment as a laborer at a construction site and 
doing yard work at the home of one of the owners, as well as loading furniture 
at a warehouse and placing merchandise in customers’ cars.177  These positions 
did not have the same level of customer or public contact as the position held 
when the employee caused the harm.178 
 
 172. Kan. State Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587, 597 
(Kan. 1991) (involving sexual molestation of special education child by employee retained by 
school district to transport students enrolled in program). 
 173. T.W. v. City of New York, 729 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97–98 (App. Div. 2001). 
 174. Id. at 98. 
 175. Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 961, 975 (D. Minn. 
1998). 
 176. Id. at 983. 
 177. Tallahassee Furniture Co., Inc. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991). 
 178. Id. 
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This court concluded that a jury could find the employer liable based on 
the employer’s failure to base its hiring decision on “whether his character, 
conduct, and mental condition were such as to ensure the safety of its 
customers.”179  In reviewing the negligent retention claim against this 
employer, the court considered the employer’s knowledge that the employee 
was a heavy cocaine and heroin user during his employment and had prior 
psychiatric hospitalization, while tending to discount his driving without a 
license and failure to return a rent-to-own television that violated his 
probation.180 
These decisions resulted in liability even though the employer had some 
valid reasons to hire the applicant with either a past conviction or past negative 
behavior.  Much like the cases outlined above that focused only on the nature 
of the past conduct, these cases would discourage an employer from adopting a 
more individualized approach that would mirror the EEOC guidance for 
avoiding adverse impact claims. 
1. Circumstances Undermining Liability 
In some courts that rely on a totality of circumstances approach, the 
personal characteristics of an employee who causes harm can be used by an 
employer to avoid liability under a negligent hiring theory.  For example, a 
federal court in New York granted summary judgment for a children’s home 
whose mentor molested a resident.181  The molestation was not foreseeable by 
the home despite the following: 
(1) [the mentor] was perceived to be a homosexual; (2) [the mentor] only 
expressed interest in mentoring boys between the ages eight and twelve; (3) 
[the resident] started experiencing nightmares while at [the home] for the first 
time in his life; and (4) [the mentor] gave [the resident] numerous expensive 
gifts that he brought back to [the home].182 
In this case, since the mentor had no prior criminal record or history of 
sexual misconduct and had worked with children without incident in the past, 
the characteristics noted above did not give the employer reason to know that 
the mentor might endanger children.183  The court considered the fact that the 
mentor had prior positive volunteer experience with children, certification 
from both the New York State Department of Social Services and the Family 
Service of Westchester to board a child, and three positive references.184 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 754. 
 181. Estevez-Yelcin v. Children’s Village Corp., No. 01-CV-8784 (KMK), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 39029, at *17, *20 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2006). 
 182. Id. at *23. 
 183. Id. at *24, *33. 
 184. Id. at *33. 
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Self-assessment and the opinions of others were significant in another case 
in which an acupuncturist’s assault of a patient was determined to be 
unforeseeable for an employer.185  That employer had been told by a county 
counselor that the employee had expertise in acupuncture and had been 
employed at a chiropractic clinic, whose doctor spoke highly of the 
employee.186 The interview also supported the employer’s lack of liability, 
where the employee stated that he was a fourth-generation acupuncturist with 
the equivalent of a doctorate of acupuncture, the employer saw his diplomas 
and books he had written on Chinese remedies and acupuncture, and the 
employee verified that he would use acupuncture methods that were accepted 
in the United States.187 
The hiring and interview process was also important for a school to avoid 
liability for a teacher’s sexual abuse of a student.188  A school board member 
had known the teacher’s family for years and had recommended the teacher for 
the position, the teacher was recommended by his previous employer, and the 
school board interviewed him prior to hire.189  Similarly, the family of a rape 
and murder victim was unable to hold the employer liable, even though the 
employee had a record of prior convictions for rape and aggravated sodomy.190  
The employee was described as a “very polite, dependable, soft-spoken, 
likeable, and trustworthy employee,” and the employer had no knowledge of 
any “improper or offensive behavior directed at fellow employees.”191 
Under the totality of circumstances approach, negative information about 
the harmful employee’s characteristics that relate to the work may not be 
enough to impose liability on the employer.  Even an applicant’s failure to 
meet an employer’s own expectations was not enough to support an 
employer’s liability in one case.  This employee’s lack of experience relative to 
the employer’s own requirements was insufficient to hold the employer liable 
for negligently hiring an employee that engaged in sexual abuse of a resident 
of a care facility, where the required year of security experience only meant 
“experience protecting persons or property from harm by others—not from 
harm caused by the very person performing the security function.”192  The 
court concluded that there was “no causal contention between [the employee’s] 
 
 185. L.J. v. Shu Dian Peng, No. C0-96-2197, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 515, at *7 (Minn. Ct. 
App. May 6, 1997). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Adorno v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 505, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Schmidt v. HTG, Inc., 961 P.2d 677, 677, 696 (Kan. 1998). 
 191. Id. at 692. 
 192. Adorno, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
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alleged lack of security experience and the abuse of his supervisory authority 
over the residents.”193 
Similarly, a checkered employment history may not be enough to hold the 
employer liable.  For example, a trucking company was granted summary 
judgment despite the fact that a driver who raped a passenger in his truck had 
held seven jobs in less than a year and a half.194  The court found that this fact 
may have indicated that the driver “probably would not stay on a particular job 
for very long,” but concluded that his job history was “not evidence of a 
tendency to commit rape or to engage in deviant sexual activity or that he had a 
proclivity towards it.”195 
These cases demonstrate that in some courts, an employer may be able to 
escape liability by relying on personal characteristics of an applicant, even 
though that applicant’s past convictions or bad behavior would have allowed 
for liability in courts relying only on the relationship between the current harm 
and the employee’s past conduct.  For an employer operating in different 
states, this means that in some jurisdictions, it should consider the individual 
characteristics of an applicant with a criminal record in deciding whether that 
applicant poses a foreseeable risk of causing harm to others at work.  Yet in 
states that rely only on the nature of the crime and its relationship to the harm 
caused, the same employer could face liability for negligent hiring if it relies 
too much on the positive personal information about the ex-offender applicant. 
2. Role of Professional Opinions 
A professional’s opinion about the general characteristics or surrounding 
circumstances of an employee’s misbehavior can sometimes help to defeat a 
claim of negligent hiring, just as the courts described above allowed an 
employer to rely on positive information learned during the hiring process.  For 
example, a determination that an ex-offender was eligible for probation or 
parole may be enough to relieve an employer of liability for harm caused later 
by that parolee.  One employer was found not liable for the murder committed 
by an employee who had been released on parole after serving time for 
multiple violent sex offenses.196  The Massachusetts court held that in deciding 
to hire this ex-offender, the employer could reasonably rely on doctors’ 
professional evaluations and their recommendation to the parole board that he 
be released.197 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. A.C. v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., No. 91-C-1168 B, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7251, at 
*29–30 (D. Utah Mar. 30, 1993), adopted by CC v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 913 
(D. Utah. 1993). 
 195. Id. at *30. 
 196. Coughlin v. Titus & Bean Graphics, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 106, 112 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). 
 197. Id. at 112. 
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The Massachusetts court noted that the employer was justified in relying 
on the employee’s twelve years of treatment, in which he “progressed to an 
extraordinary degree,” and the fact that he had served much of his conviction 
time in a community release program.198  The employer was also justified in 
relying on the parole board’s opinion that he was “now a good risk for 
supervised release via parole.”199 
This court also relied on the reasoning of a Florida court that: 
For us to hold that an employer can never hire a person with a criminal record 
or retain such a person as its employee “at the risk of being held liable for his 
tortious assault flies in the face of the premise that society must make a 
reasonable effort to rehabilitate those who have gone astray.”200 
Following this same reasoning, a second Massachusetts employer was not 
liable for harm caused by an employee who had been convicted of possession 
of child pornography but had been given probation, because “[h]is release on 
probation is indicative of a professional judgment that [the employee] was not 
a danger to society.”201 
Like the reliance on the opinions of third party professionals, standardized 
testing of the applicant prior to hire may be enough to relieve the employer of 
liability for harm later caused by that employee.  For example, a city was not 
liable for hiring an officer who took sexually explicit photos and sexually 
assaulted a female detainee, even though the officer admitted that he had an 
addiction to pornography, and other officers believed that he was a pervert.202  
In dismissing the claim for negligent hiring, the court relied on the city’s 
psychological evaluation of the officer, which “consisted of approximately six 
hours of examination and a 45-minute personal interview with a licensed 
psychiatrist,” and which was in compliance “with guidelines promulgated by 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police.”203 
This court noted in particular that one of the tests administered, the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2, was “designed to assess 
psychological problems, such as depression, anxiety, anti-social behavior, 
alcoholism, aggressiveness, impulsiveness, paranoia, and lack of anger control.  
Some questions probe into potential sexual problems.”204  The testing 
 
 198. Id. at 112 n.9. 
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vindicated the employer since the test results did not indicate that the officer 
had a sexual or pornographic obsession, and nothing in the officer’s 
background investigation indicated that he was “unfit to be a police officer.”205  
Similarly, a school’s reliance on a volunteer’s reference from a teacher in 
addition to the interview relieved the school from any obligation to investigate 
his background further absent evidence of impropriety.206 
A positive review from a previous employer, like a medical opinion, can 
undermine foreseeability.  A sheriff’s department was not liable for alleged 
mistreatment of a jail detainee by one of its officers despite allegations that the 
officer had been discharged from a foundry job after cutting off part of a co-
worker’s hair during a disagreement less than two years earlier.207  
Characterizing that behavior as “unfortunate,” the court found that his behavior 
was not the kind that would disqualify a person from working as a jail officer 
“or for any other employment.”208  As in cases where employers successfully 
relied on parole decisions, the court here considered the employee’s honorable 
discharge from the Army nine years earlier, as well as the absence of any 
assault or injury to another person and the lack of any other prior discipline by 
any other employer.209 
Likewise, a church was not liable for the sexual misconduct of a minister 
with a parishioner.210  Although the minister’s psychological evaluation 
showed potential “difficulty controlling his impulses, a tendency to use poor 
judgment, a tendency to disregard the rights of others, and a likelihood to 
express aggression in a physical manner,” the evaluation also demonstrated 
several positive characteristics, indicating that the minister was “very social 
and interested in leadership in [sic] service to other people.”211  The court held 
that these test results did not make his sexual misconduct foreseeable.212 
Following the guidelines for avoiding liability for hiring decisions with 
adverse impact, New York State has adopted requirements that employers 
refrain from inquiring into an applicant’s background unless that criminal 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Koran I. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 683 N.Y.S.2d 228, 230 (App. Div. 1998). 
 207. Moore v. Hosier, 43 F. Supp. 2d 978, 992–93 (N.D. Ind. 1998). 
 208. Id. at 993. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Alpharetta First United Methodist Church v. Stewart, 472 S.E.2d 532, 536–37 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
 211. Id. at 236 (testing included Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Interpersonal 
Behavior Survey, Strong-Campbell Interest Inventory, and Sentence Completion Test). 
 212. Id.  See also Heckenlaible v. Va. Peninsula Reg’l Jail Auth., 491 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554 
(E.D. Va. 2007) (holding that a jail is not liable for employee who assaulted a female detainee 
because psychological or psychiatric testing would not have revealed that the employee would 
have posed a danger to inmates at the jail). 
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reground has some relationship to the position being filled.213  And as in the 
totality of circumstances test, New York allows ex-offenders to seek a 
“certificate of relief from disabilities” showing that an ex-offender is in good 
standing with the court or parole board.214  A certificate is only issued if 
“consistent with the rehabilitation of the eligible offender;” and the relief to be 
granted by the certificate is “consistent with the public interest.”215  To refuse 
to hire an ex-offender with such a certificate based on his convictions, an 
employer must rebut the presumption that the ex-offender is rehabilitated.216 
Even this protective statute, however, does not guarantee that a compliant 
employer will not be liable for negligently hiring an employee who later causes 
harm.  One commentator suggests that “[i]f a statute prohibits an inquiry, it is 
then illegal for the employer to pursue that inquiry.  If no other avenues exist 
to find out about criminal history, any such history would by definition be 
‘unforeseeable.’”217  However, New York’s statute does not provide specific 
protection for employers against liability for negligent hiring, even where the 
protective statute prohibits the rejection of applicants based on criminal 
records.  These cases using the totality of circumstances approach demonstrate 
that additional positive or negative information about the employee can affect 
the foreseeability of the harm.  In contrast, courts which look only at the 
characteristics of the employee’s previous crime or particular bad behavior will 
likely find the harm was foreseeable, if there is a sufficient relationship 
between that past behavior and the harm in question. 
III.  LIMITED GUIDANCE FROM SECTION 1983 CLAIMS 
Cases applying the deliberate indifference standard under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1966 provide some guidance as to how courts could more consistently 
determine whether an employer is liable on a negligent hiring theory.  In a 
Section 1983 claim, a victim of misconduct by a public employee may seek to 
recover from the public employer but must first show that the decision to hire 
that public employee was made with deliberate indifference to the rights of the 
victim.218  Applying this standard, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that an 
injured party must show that the hiring decision made by the public employer 
 
 213. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney Supp. 2010). 
 214. Id. § 753(2). 
 215. Id. § 702(2)(b)–(c). 
 216. Id. § 753(2). 
 217. Ryan D. Watstein, Note, Out of Jail and Out of Luck: The Effect of Negligent Hiring 
Liability and the Criminal Record Revolution on an Ex-Offender’s Employment Prospects, 61 
FLA. L. REV. 581, 607 n.207 (2009). 
 218. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). 
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showed a “deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular 
constitutional or statutory right” will follow that hiring decision.219 
This deliberate indifference standard is met where “adequate scrutiny of an 
applicant’s background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that 
the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be 
the deprivation of a third party’s federally protected right.”220  In other words, 
this public employee was “highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered” 
by the victim of the public employee’s actions.221  The Supreme Court has 
explained that “the background of the particular applicant and the specific 
constitutional violation alleged must be strong” and has also described the 
standard as whether the employee’s record makes the use of excessive force “a 
plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision.”222 
Application of this standard by lower federal courts provides some insight 
into negligent hiring decisions under state law.  Like the negligent hiring 
decisions outlined above, previous “bad behavior” by a public employee will 
not necessarily show that the public employer showed deliberate indifference 
in hiring that employee.  For example, in Butler v. Nance, the use of excessive 
force while stopping a vehicle was not foreseeable even though an officer had 
a long history of violating procedures. 223  The officer’s personnel file showed 
he had: 
lost his temper . . . ; lied to cover up violations of policy instead of admitting 
errors; threatened to arrest a person if he did not leave a convenience store as 
ordered; failed to confirm existence of a warrant before arresting the driver of 
a vehicle; threatened to have a vehicle towed if the driver did not consent to a 
search of the vehicle; made two passengers of a vehicle get on the ground 
when he found a BB gun in the vehicle; threatened to tear up a car if the driver 
did not tell him where drugs were hidden; refused to accept assistance from 
others; [and] was terminated for failing to meet [the police department’s] 
minimum standards for an officer and failing to successfully complete 
probation.224 
Similarly, an officer’s history of hitting an inmate and having protective 
orders obtained against him by his wife and girlfriend were insufficient to 
support the department’s liability for excessive use of force.225  The officer 
also had a history of 
 
 219. Id. at 411. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 412 (emphasis omitted). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Butler v. Nance, No. 4:01-CV-0093-A, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9193 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 
2002). 
 224. Id. at *12–13. 
 225. Morris v. Crawford Cnty., 299 F.3d 919, 924–26 (8th Cir. 2002). 
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mishandling inmates’ money and property; “mouthing off” to two fellow 
deputies . . . ; disobeying a nurse . . . [and saying] “he was going to knock that 
bitch out”; and acting insubordinate at work, disobeying orders, cursing other 
employees, failing to adhere to rules (i.e., leaving his post with no officer on 
duty and failing to answer his radio when a supervisor attempted to contact 
him).  There [we]re also accusations . . . that he ran [his ex-wife] off the road, 
tore a necklace off her neck, and pushed her, as well as accusations by [his 
girlfriend] that . . . he grabbed her arm and threw her, and threatened to assault 
her.226 
The court concluded that even though the officer’s record “may have made 
him a poor candidate for a position as a detention center deputy,” it was 
insufficient to support a claim of deliberate indifference.227 
Like some cases reviewing a claim of negligent hiring, the lack of a 
relationship between the previous bad behavior and the current misconduct 
may be enough to defeat a finding of deliberate indifference.  For example, the 
unreasonable seizure of a person, use of excessive force and the filing of 
unfounded criminal charges were insufficiently related to a special deputy’s 
record of stealing property to impose liability on the sheriff’s department, even 
though that misdemeanor made him ineligible for the position under both state 
law and the department’s policy.228 
Mirroring some of the negligent hiring cases outlined above, the record of 
bad behavior by an employee may not make his harmful conduct foreseeable.  
For example, an officer’s alleged use of excessive force was not foreseeable 
despite his record of what the court called an “attitudinal problem”: 
withholding food from another inmate and lying to his superiors during an 
investigation, verbal confrontations with inmates, accusations of grabbing an 
inmate, and being suspended for one day for “failure to promote mutual respect 
within the profession (insubordination); dereliction of duty; failure to exercise 
due diligence/interest in pursuit of duties; conduct unbecoming; and using 
profane language.”229  Even two prior incidents of using excessive force was 
insufficient to hold a police department liable for one of its officers use of 
excessive force several years later, despite the fact that one of those previous 
incidents had resulted in his discharge.230 
Like users of excessive force, public officials who commit sexual assault 
may not trigger liability for their public employers even if they have not been a 
 
 226. Id. 924–25. 
 227. Id. at 925–26. 
 228. Crumes v. Myers Protective Servs., Inc., No. 1:03-cv-1135-DFH-TAB, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7653, at *16–22 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 22, 2005). 
 229. Totman v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, No. 3:07-CV-73-S, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11578, at *12–15 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 17, 2009). 
 230. Hellmann v. Kercher, No. 07-1373, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17279, at *32–33 (W.D. Pa. 
Mar. 6, 2009). 
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model employee in the past.  For example, an officer who committed sexual 
assault had a record of being too aggressive, and had “letters of reprimand and 
sustained complaints for being overbearing and abusive during a traffic stop,” 
but he “had never sexually assaulted, sexually harassed, falsely arrested, 
improperly searched or seized, or used excessive force against any third 
party.”231 
Similarly, sexual assaults on inmates by officers were found to be 
insufficiently related to one officer’s history of being “rough with inmates” and 
getting “friendly” with female inmates at his previous job,232 nor with another 
officer’s two felony drug convictions.233  Sexual assault by an officer with the 
sheriff’s department was also insufficiently related to his “terroristic 
threatening and criminal trespass [charges] relating to [an] incident with his ex-
wife,” which were dismissed, and his guilty plea in a harassment charge when 
he was a juvenile.234  Similarly, an officer’s rape was found insufficiently 
foreseeable despite a previous complaint of harassment against him, and his 
participation in two physical fights.235 
Limitations on liability are not limited to officers’ misconduct.  As with 
negligent hiring claims, courts look for a connection between previous bad 
behavior and the harm in question.  In a school setting, a teacher’s prior 
viewing of pornographic material on his previous employer’s computer was 
insufficient indication that he would sexually abuse the children he taught.236  
Similarly, a hospital was not liable for a doctor’s failure to diagnose a 
condition, even though his privileges had been suspended at another hospital 
due to “chart delinquency” and he had settled five malpractice complaints filed 
against him in the past, since he was certified to practice medicine and had 
emergency room experience.237 
A record of misbehavior outside of the workplace may also be 
insufficiently related to the officers’ harmful conduct as a public employee.  
For example, a public employer was not liable for the murder committed by 
 
 231. Gros v. City of Grand Prairie, 209 F.3d 431, 435–36 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 232. Adams v. City of Balcones Heights, No. SA-03-CA-0219-XR, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
30508, at *18–19 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2004). 
 233. Washington v. City of Shreveport, No. 03-2057, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42940, at *34 
n.7 (W.D. La. June 26, 2006). 
 234. Parrish v. Fite, No. 06-6024, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79289, at *14–15 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 
7, 2008). 
 235. Franklin v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, No. 3:05CV-76-H, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 50695, at *7–9 (W.D. Ky. July 11, 2007).  The court did note that the failure to uncover 
the complaint might, at worst, constitute negligence.  Id. at *7. 
 236. Doe v. Fults, No. 3:04-0143, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3012, at *20–21 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 
20, 2006) (acknowledging that the school might have been negligent, but was clearly not 
deliberately indifferent). 
 237. Bednar v. Cnty. of Schuylkill, 29 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255–56 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1036 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1001 
one of its employees, even though the murderer had a record of threatening a 
woman with arrest, interfering with that mother’s supervision of her child 
while he was off duty, wanting to “ride where the women were,” and 
assaulting and pistol-whipping a teenage boy.238 
A. Sufficient Connection 
In some instances, a public employee’s prior conduct may be sufficient to 
impose liability on the hiring employer.  Courts are more likely to find 
deliberate indifference where the harmful conduct is similar to the employee’s 
past behavior.  For example, an officer’s dismissal from another department 
based on allegations of indecent exposure was enough to sustain the claim of a 
detainee who was taken to a remote location by an officer who exposed 
himself and attempted sodomize the detainee.239  Similarly, a city manager’s 
record of sexual harassment of his former coworkers was sufficiently related to 
his harassment of city employees to support the city’s liability for hiring 
him.240  
Behavior indicating a propensity for inappropriate treatment of others may 
be sufficient.  For example, an officer’s “history of crude and insulting 
behavior towards women” and “tendency to insult and cause stress to members 
of the female sex” was enough to hold his subsequent employer liable for harm 
caused when he transporting female prisoners.241  Another police department 
was potentially liable for his assault on a female citizen, where he had a record 
of harassing two different motorists and his suspension from his previous 
position based on complaints against him.242  Similarly, a university could be 
held liable for the sexual assault by a professor with a student, where he had a 
history of other inappropriate advances toward and comments about other 
female students for which the same university had sent him for counseling but 
had not disciplined him.243  These deliberate indifference claims focus on 
similarities in the conduct of the offending employee. 
 
 238. Aguillard v. McGowen, 207 F.3d 226, 230–31 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 239. Romero v. City of Clanton, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1318, 1321–22 (M.D. Ala. 2002). 
 240. Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 241. Jones v. Stoneking, No. 02-4131 (JNE/RLE), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3096, at *9–13 (D. 
Minn. Feb. 24, 2005). 
 242. Birdwell v. Corso, No. 3:07-0629, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44388, at *17–19 (M.D. Tenn. 
May 21, 2009).  See also M.C. v. Pavlovich, No. 4:07-cv-2060, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56829, at 
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B. Totality Factors Considered 
A public employer may also be able to rely on individual information 
about an applicant in avoiding liability for their subsequent misconduct, similar 
to the reasoning used in applying the totality of circumstances test.  Following 
this logic, a police department was not liable for the excessive force used by an 
officer who had used excessive force on three prior occasions, while working 
for two other police departments.244  The court noted in granting summary 
judgment for the police department that the chief of police from one of those 
previous employers told the hiring chief of police “there were no concerns 
regarding [the officer] and that [the officer] would make a fine police 
officer.”245 
Professional opinions sometimes play a determinative role in deliberate 
indifference cases.  The beating and stabbing of a person picked up in by an 
officer in his patrol car was not foreseeable by the county police department, 
even though that officer had shot an invader in his own home seven years prior 
being hired.246  A psychologist had reviewed that shooting when the officer 
was hired and recommended employment.247  This favorable medical opinion 
protected the department from liability for his subsequent violent behavior. 
Even an unfavorable medical opinion may be insufficient to establish 
liability.  For example, one court found that a shooting by an officer was 
insufficiently related to his poor performance on a psychological test 
specifically designed to measure his suitability for public safety employment.  
This lack of connection protected the department from liability, even though 
that test performance normally would have disqualified him from employment 
as an officer.  The department also relied on the fact that where he later 
performed much better on the test, and the test was only one factor of many 
considered during the hiring process.248 
Although these cases arise in the constitutional context, they apply 
approaches similar to the courts which review negligent hiring cases.  Some 
rely heavily on the connection between the public employee’s prior “bad” 
behavior and the harm caused as an employee, while other decisions allow for 
some consideration of the individual characteristics of the public employee to 
determine whether the public employer should be liable under the “deliberate 
indifference” standard.  Yet even under this constitutional standard, an 
employer remains unsure as to how to treat the application of an ex-offender 
 
 244. Leno v. Stupik, No. 1:07-CV-163, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104703, at *20–22 (D. Vt. 
Dec. 29, 2008). 
 245. Id. at *22. 
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who has shown some rehabilitation and even changes in behavior that would 
justify his or her hire. 
IV.  GUIDANCE FROM ADA DIRECT THREAT CASES 
Like a claim of negligent hiring or deliberate indifference, a claim by a 
person with a disability may raise the question of whether an employee or 
applicant poses a direct threat to themselves or others under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA).  If a person poses a direct threat, then they are not 
otherwise qualified for the position under the ADA, unless a reasonable 
accommodation would reduce or eliminate that threat.249  Given the fact that 
many ex-offenders have a history of or a current mental illness,250 these 
standards are applicable to determine whether applicants with a criminal record 
would cause foreseeable injury.  The direct threat cases under the ADA can 
provide some more concrete guidance for negligent hiring claims, since courts 
in these cases often review whether the employer made an appropriate 
determination that the applicant or employee posed a direct threat. 
Importantly, both the courts and the EEOC have ruled that the 
determination of whether someone poses a direct threat should include an 
“individualized assessment” of the person’s condition and limitations.251  For 
example, one court relied on the individualized assessment requirement in 
holding that persons civilly committed after a finding that they posed a threat 
to themselves or others did not per se pose a “direct threat” under the ADA.252 
Similarly, courts have held that an employer should not assume that 
anyone who is HIV positive or has diabetes poses a direct threat without an 
individualized assessment showing that the disability impeded their ability to 
perform the duties of their position.  In reversing a finding that an applicant’s 
diabetes posed a direct threat to his performance as a police officer, the Fifth 
Circuit held that an individualized assessment of his present ability to safely 
perform the essential functions of that position was required.253  That court 
referenced the Supreme Court’s directive that “[a]n individualized assessment 
of the effect of an impairment is particularly necessary when the impairment is 
one whose symptoms vary widely from person to person.”254  Summary 
 
 249. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2006). 
 250. Steadman et al., supra note 6, at 764–65; JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 6, at 1. 
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 254. Id. at 499 (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 199). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT HIRING OF EX-OFFENDERS 1039 
judgment was inappropriate where the medical evidence established that the 
diabetic employee may have been safe to perform his duties as a police 
officer.255  The court also referred to changes in federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations that required case-by-case consideration of diabetes incidences.256 
The EEOC regulations specifically state that an individualized assessment 
“shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most 
current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.”257  
These regulations have been cited favorably by the Supreme Court.258  Further, 
the EEOC suggests that to determine whether someone would pose a direct 
threat, these factors should be considered: “(1) The duration of the risk; (2) 
The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the 
potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.”259  
The EEOC’s technical assistance manual clarifies that an employer must show 
a significant risk of substantial harm, and that the risk is specific and current, 
“as based on objective medical or other factual evidence.”260 
Courts have required that an employer present “substantial information” on 
the person’s work history and medical status to establish a direct threat.261  The 
determination of whether the person poses a direct threat should be “based 
upon ‘particularized facts using the best available objective evidence as 
required by the regulations.”262  One court also noted that this individual 
assessment should be accurate: “[T]here is no defense of reasonable 
mistake.”263 
An employer often justifies its decision that an employee or applicant 
poses a direct threat by relying on medical opinions regarding that persons’ 
condition.  For example, one employer was justified in finding that a mine 
employee posed a direct threat based on his mental health issues after an 
independent medical evaluation concluded that he posed a risk to himself and 
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others if he worked as a “blaster” in the mine.264  The court affirmed that “no 
reasonable jury could fault the Mine for its decision to preclude [the 
employee’s] return to work until it received assurance from a doctor that [he] 
no longer posed a safety risk.”265 
Similarly, in the Hutton case, an employer was able to show that an 
employee with diabetes posed a direct threat in working at a chemical plant.266  
The employer relied on doctors’ opinions that it was “unrealistic to expect [the 
employee] not to continue to have recurrent hypoglycemic events,” and that 
“there was no way to guarantee that [the employee] will not have another 
hypoglycemic episode or [to judge] its severity.”267  One doctor further 
observed that the employee was “developing diminishing awareness of his 
hypoglycemic symptoms” and that the records reflected “areas of poor self-
management of his condition.”268 
In Hutton, professional opinions conflicted.269  The court relied on the fact 
that “[n]one of the examining or consulting physicians could rule out the 
occurrence of a hypoglycemic event that would affect [the employee’s] ability 
to remain conscious, alert, and communicative, especially in light of [his] 
somewhat erratic medical history.”270 
A substantiated medical opinion establishing that the employee poses a 
direct threat may be enough overcome a lack of evidence that the employee’s 
condition has caused harm in the past.  In one case, an employee with epilepsy 
who could show that he had safely used kitchen equipment with another 
employer was still shown to be a direct threat, based on his doctor’s opinion 
that he posed a risk to others.271  The court concluded that “one employer’s 
willingness to bear the risk of harm does not constitute evidence rendering 
other employers liable under the ADA for their refusal to bear that same 
risk.”272 
In contrast, an employer was not entitled to conclude that an employee 
posed a direct threat because of her seizure disorder, where her neurologist 
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concluded that she did not pose a risk in her positions of sales clerk and 
assistant manager.273  Medical evidence that the employee does not pose a 
direct threat will be weighted according to “all of the circumstances of the 
patient’s case, including the nature and extent of the care and the degree of 
knowledge the physician may have as to the physical dangers the particular 
work environment presents.”274 
An employee does not necessarily pose a direct threat even if some 
medical evidence supports a finding that harm is a possibility.  One court 
refused to find that a Wal-Mart sales associate with a fainting disorder posed a 
direct threat, even though she had suffered two fainting episodes at work, 
where Wal-Mart argued that she could drop merchandise on someone.275  The 
court ruled that a doctor’s testimony that harm was “‘possible’ but ‘very 
unlikely’” was, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish that the employee 
posed a direct threat.276 
Even if the employer has some medical opinion in its favor that would 
show a direct threat, the issue may be referred to a jury if there is some 
question of fact as to whether that medical opinion was based on the most 
current medical knowledge or the best objective evidence.277  The Supreme 
Court rejected the argument that a medical opinion offered by an employer 
“could excuse discrimination without regard to the objective reasonableness of 
his actions.”278  The Court explained that a health care provider has a “duty to 
assess the risk of infection based on the objective, scientific information 
available to him and others in his profession.  His belief that a significant risk 
existed, even if maintained in good faith, would not relieve him from 
liability.”279 
This means that a subjective opinion about the risk is not going to 
overcome medical evidence showing that a risk does not exist, given the 
person’s particular job duties.  As the Echazabel Court noted, the subjective 
belief of the employer’s doctors regarding the work requirements is 
 
 273. Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 220–21 (2d Cir. 2001).  See 
also Justice v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 527 F.3d 1080, 1091–92 (10th Cir. 2008) (reversing 
summary judgment for employer where objective medical opinion was inconclusive that 
employee posed risk to self or others). 
 274. Echazabel v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1033 n.11 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 275. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 276. Id. at 1248. 
 277. See Echazabel, 336 F.3d at 1031–32.  See also Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 
283 F.3d 11, 31 (1st Cir. 2002) (merely obtaining medical opinion does not automatically absolve 
employer). 
 278. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649–50 (1998) (finding individual doctor’s 
unsupported belief that patient’s HIV status rendered her a health risk not dispositive). 
 279. Id. at 649. 
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irrelevant.280  Similarly, another court noted that “[c]ourts need not defer to an 
individual doctor’s opinion that is neither based on the individualized inquiry 
mandated by the ADA nor supported by objective scientific and medical 
evidence.”281 
A medical opinion may also be discounted if it is not current and based on 
a thorough assessment of the employee.  For example, an employer was unable 
to show that an amputee employee posed a direct threat.282  The employer had 
relied on restrictions which were imposed by its doctor, but those restrictions 
were based on a brief meeting with the employee seventeen months earlier as 
well as the doctor’s assumption that all similar amputees have the same 
limitations.283  The court concluded that the direct threat conclusion was not 
based on “particularized facts using the best available objective evidence as 
required by the regulations.”284 
Evidence of the level of threat posed by a person’s medical condition need 
not come from a health care professional.  For example, a physician who 
smelled of alcohol according to a co-worker and patients posed a direct 
threat.285  Similarly, employees’ own testimony about the effects of their 
diabetes can be enough to establish a direct threat.286  For example, if a person 
relates a history of low blood sugar episodes and failure to seek medical 
attention, his employer may be able to conclude diabetes could pose a direct 
threat.287 
Objective evidence was also used to defeat a claim of direct threat in a case 
challenging the placement of a methadone clinic in a neighborhood.288  The 
clinic was able to show that it did not pose a direct threat under Title II of the 
ADA where there was no objective evidence to support the state’s assertion of 
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a “frequent association” between clinics and criminal activity, and there had 
been no criminal incidents at the particular clinic in question.289 
Another court finding that a methadone clinic did not pose a direct threat 
noted that the clinic might actually reduce crime by treating drug addictions.290  
This court also considered the fact that only six percent of its patients tested 
positive for drug use after six months of treatment, even though patients 
enrolled for less than six months tested positive at a rate of thirty percent.291 
Objective information about the person’s past behavior, combined with a 
medical opinion, can also establish a direct threat.  In a case involving a 
suicidal employee, the employee’s past behavior as well as her doctor’s 
testimony supported giving a jury instruction that the employee would need to 
prove that she did not pose a direct threat in her position as a police officer.292  
In finding that she posed a direct threat, the jury considered her reckless use of 
a firearm while she was off duty and her doctor’s testimony that outpatient 
treatment had not prevented her from committed self-mutilation and an 
overdose.293  Even though the doctor did not opine that she posed a direct 
threat, his testimony was sufficient to support the jury’s decision that she did 
pose a threat. 
Past behavior also was considered in rejecting summary judgment for 
Chevron, where the employee who allegedly posed a direct threat to himself 
based on his liver functioning had worked at Chevron’s refinery for over 
twenty years without incident or injury.294  Similarly, a police force applicant 
who successfully served as officer while HIV positive with other law 
enforcement agencies was able to overcome the department doctor’s 
unsubstantiated opinion that he posed a direct threat.295  The court concluded 
that given the applicant’s successful performance, the department “was not 
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entitled to simply rely on the physician’s recommendation as the basis for 
withdrawing its employment offer.”296 
In contrast to these cases, past incidents can sometimes establish that an 
employee poses a direct threat.  For example, an employee who suffered from 
anxiety disorder was a direct threat where she had suffered two panic attacks at 
work and the stress associated with her position could have caused more 
attacks.297  Diabetic employees have been shown to pose a direct threat based 
on prior episodes at work which caused legitimate safety concerns.298 
These ADA cases illustrate how a court can engage in a standardized, 
objective review of whether an employee should be anticipated to pose a direct 
threat in the workplace.  This same approach can be borrowed in court 
decisions regarding whether an employer should have foreseen that an 
employee would cause harm so as to impose liability for the negligent hiring of 
that employee. 
First, the ADA cases suggest that employers should engage in an 
individualized inquiry regarding an applicant’s potential for harmful behavior.  
This means that employers should not rely on a “one size fits all” policy of 
excluding all ex-offenders, or ignoring any past criminal or “bad” behavior.  
Instead, like the ADA cases, an employer should gather as much information 
as possible about an individual applicant and make an individual determination 
about whether than applicant can be expected to cause harm to others as an 
employee. 
Second, the ADA cases rely heavily on professional opinions regarding the 
employee’s propensity to cause harm.  Moreover, that professional opinion 
should be based on objective information about the employee’s personal 
characteristics and past behavior.  This means that employers should seek out 
the opinions of professionals who have had contact with an ex-offender 
applicant who may have either a positive or negative opinion about their 
propensity to engage in harmful behavior in the workplace. 
CONCLUSION 
Employers who receive applications from ex-offenders face a dilemma.  
On the one hand, to avoid liability for adverse impact, employers cannot adopt 
a blanket ban on hiring ex-offenders.  Instead, both the courts and the EEOC 
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encourage employers to consider individual characteristics about the applicant 
with a criminal record to determine whether that record is related to the 
position being filled.299 
On the other hand, employers seeking to avoid liability for negligent hiring 
are faced with a myriad of standards and cases applying those standards which 
provide limited guidance as to how to avoid that liability.  Cases which rely 
heavily on the nature of the crime appear to mirror the emphasis in adverse 
impact cases on the relationship between the position being filled and the 
nature of the crime committed.300 
However, adverse impact claims also require an individual analysis.  If an 
employer follows the guidance of the negligent hiring cases that focus only on 
the crime or bad act committed in the past, that employer will be ignoring the 
individual characteristics which could demonstrate that the crime committed in 
the past is not strongly related to the duties and expectations of the position 
being filled.301 
In contrast, the totality of circumstances standard provides more 
opportunities for an employer to defend itself against claims of negligent 
hiring.  If an employer receives an application from an ex-offender who has 
shown that he or she is unlikely to engage in that same or similar behavior in 
the future, that employer may be able to avoid liability for negligent hiring, 
even if that employee subsequently causes harm.  However, even some of the 
courts applying the totality of circumstances standard would allow a jury to 
determine if an employer should be liable, even where the employer had 
reliable, positive information about the applicant with a criminal record. 
To provide more certainty and guidance for employers who hire applicants 
with criminal records, courts should look to the cases which have been decided 
under the direct threat standard of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well 
as those courts which have looked to professional opinions in applying the 
totality of circumstances standard.  By using these opinions as a guide, courts 
hearing negligent hiring cases can make a determination as to whether an 
employer was reasonable in relying on a professional opinion that the applicant 
with a criminal record was not likely to cause harm in the workplace. 
Standardizing the defenses of employers in negligent hiring cases will 
result in two positive outcomes.  First, employers will be encouraged to obtain 
professional opinions in making hiring decisions.  Reliance on professional 
opinions will objectify the hiring process and result in less arbitrary and 
potentially discriminatory exclusion of applicants with criminal records.  
Second, employers can feel more comfortable in hiring applicants with 
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criminal records where the behavior and personal characteristics of those 
applicants demonstrate that they are unlikely to recidivate.  Second chances for 
applicants with criminal records who seek employment will encourage their 
productivity and lawful behavior in society.  With such positive outcomes in 
sight, courts should consider adopting a broader and more standardized 
approach to negligent hiring claims. 
 
 
 
